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SALT TWO-I
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 2
US Mission
1100 Hours, November 24, 1972

Persons Present

Ambassador Smith	Minister Semenov
Ambassador Farley	General Trusov
Mr. Nitze	Mr. Shchukin
General Allison	Mr. Pleshakov
Dr. Garthoff	Mr. Grinevsky
Mr. Graybeal	General Boletsky
Mr. Shaw	Mr. Chulitsky
Mr. Earle	Mr. Skoptsov
Dr. Weiler	Col Starodubov
Mr. McCrory	Mr. Smolin
Dr. Ifft	Mr. Turalin
Lt Col Youngflesh	Capt Mazerkin
Cdr Atkinson	Mr. Shelepin
Lt Col DeSimone	Col Budantsev
Mr. Krimer (Interpreter)	Mr. Bratchikov (Interpreter)
Mr. Arensbarger (Interpreter)	Mr. Sudonkin (Interpreter)

Ambassador Smith opened this second meeting of SALT Two by welcoming Minister Semenov and the members of the Soviet Delegation to the US Mission. He then gave the floor to Minister Semenov.

Minister Semenov delivered his lengthy prepared statement and handed a draft of the Soviet proposed Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission to Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador Smith stated the US Delegation will study with great care the Soviet statement and draft document turned over to the US side.

Ambassador Smith then read his prepared statement and the draft Memorandum of Understanding regarding the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission. He gave Minister

SECRET/EXDIS

Semenov a copy of the draft Memorandum of Understanding.

Minister Semenov stated the US proposal would be studied with all the attention it deserves. He said the two sides are apparently in accord in organizing a Working Group to discuss the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission and asked Ambassador Smith if he wanted the Soviet representatives on that group identified now.

Ambassador Smith replied that would be useful.

Minister Semenov asked who would be the representatives of the US side.

Ambassador Smith responded that Mr. Graybeal would head the US group and the other members would be Mr. Shaw, Mr. Earle and Lt Col DeSimone.

Minister Semenov stated the Soviet representatives would be Mr. Smolin as their Chairman, Col Starodubov and one or two others to be named at a later date. He then stated he presumed the work would start as soon as possible.

Ambassador Smith replied that he preferred to leave the time and place of the meeting of the Working Group up to the respective Chairmen. He then recommended the meeting be adjourned and proposed the next Plenary be held at 1100 hours on 28 November at the Soviet Headquarters. Ambassador Smith suggested humorously that headquarters sounded too military. Was there a better way to describe it?

Minister Semenov accepted the proposal for the next meeting and responded that "Residence" was perhaps more accurate.

Ambassador Smith said "Residence" sounded restful and Minister Semenov agreed.

Drafted by: R.D. Youngflesh *OK*
Approved by: John P. Shaw *JS*
R. L. Garthoff *RG*

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SMITH

NOVEMBER 24, 1972

I.

Article XIII of the ABM Treaty obliges the parties to establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and through consultation to establish regulations for the SCC. We agreed toward the end of SALT ONE that an agreement establishing the SCC would be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations, and that, until the SCC was established, any consultations desired by either side under Article XIII of the Treaty or Article VI of the Interim Agreement would be carried out by the SALT Delegations when SALT was in session, and at other times by ad hoc arrangements made through normal diplomatic channels.

The U.S. Delegation is prepared to proceed promptly with establishing the SCC. We propose that this be accomplished by a Memorandum of Understanding between our two Governments which would be signed by the Chairmen of the Delegations. We are submitting today for your consideration a draft Memorandum

SECRET

-2-

of Understanding. This instrument would establish the SCC as of an agreed date. We propose the designation of one Commissioner and one Deputy Commissioner by each side. In addition, this instrument would authorize the SCC to establish its own operating procedures. This would give the SCC the necessary operational flexibility in conducting its affairs and would avoid the necessity for amending an intergovernmental agreement each time a change in procedural arrangements was found to be necessary or desirable.

II.

The SCC should promptly take up the matter of agreed procedures for the destruction, dismantling, and replacement of strategic weapon systems and components in accordance with the provisions of the agreements. The U.S. stopped construction at the Malmstrom ABM site when the ABM treaty was signed. The Soviet Union has also apparently initiated some actions to conform with the provisions of the Treaty. Actions of this type demonstrate the seriousness with which the agreements are viewed. Unilateral actions, however, do not eliminate the requirement for agreed procedures for dismantling, destruction, and replacement. Until these procedures have been agreed upon, it will not be possible to carry out fully the obligations of the agreements.

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

III

We suggest that a small joint working group be established to work out, ad referendum to Delegations, specifics of a Memorandum of Understanding. The U.S. Delegation is prepared to designate members of such a working group, and to start work immediately. We hope that agreement can be reached quickly and that the formation of the SCC can be a concrete accomplishment of this initial session of SALT TWO.

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative Commission as of _____, 1972. Each Government shall designate a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, and assign such staff personnel as it deems necessary. The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic meetings, and special meetings at the request of either commissioner, and shall establish by agreement regulations that will govern its procedures and other relevant matters, including provisions for locations and schedules of meetings.

Done in duplicate in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic, at _____ on the _____ of _____ of 1972.

For the Government
of the
United States of America

For the Government
of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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SECRET-EXDIS

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SEMENOV STATEMENT, November 24, 1972

Today we would like to continue setting forth considerations for the new stage of the negotiations.

As we have already said, our Delegations have at their disposal--in the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to Strategic Offensive Arms, which have entered into force--a good point of departure for the highly important and responsible work entrusted to us.

It is noteworthy that the preamble of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems states that "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons." It also states that "limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms." The Treaty also states the intention of the sides "to achieve

SECRET-EXDIS

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at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament."

The preamble of the Interim Agreement records the conviction of the sides that "the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States."

Therein lies the profound meaning of the situation which has been created for the new stage of our negotiations, and of the goals toward which these negotiations are directed. It is our duty to make full use of the opportunities inherent in this situation and to exert every effort in precisely these directions, considering questions which arise in the course of discussion in terms of searching for solutions that are appropriate to these directions.

SECRET-EXDIS

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SECRET-EXDIS

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In this connection we would like today to address also the need to consider questions of limiting strategic offensive air weapon systems.

There is no doubt that strategic aviation which, like other types of strategic offensive weapons, is capable of nuclear strikes on targets on the territory of the other side, is a substantial component part of strategic offensive arms. In developing more comprehensive measures to limit strategic offensive arms, strategic aviation should be considered, along with other strategic systems not covered by the Interim Agreement, of which we spoke at the last meeting, and appropriate solutions for limiting it should be found.

Limitations on strategic offensive air weapon systems, worked out in accordance with the principle of equal security which underlies our negotiations, would undoubtedly contribute to maintaining a stable strategic situation, to reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and to solving the problem of halting the strategic arms race. And, conversely, the absence of limitations on this type of strategic arms, especially in view of certain efforts to push the development and improvement of aircraft and their weapons, leaves a substantial channel

SECRET-EXDIS

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for the strategic offensive arms race. Therefore the problem of curbing and halting the strategic arms race, embodied in the agreements which have entered into force, is not adequately solved.

Limitation of strategic armaments also involves dynamics over the long term. Evidently in this respect, also, it is important to provide the most favorable conditions for a productive search for mutually acceptable solutions. It is obvious that under conditions when important agreements on limiting strategic armaments have entered into force and negotiations on further measures in this area are in progress, restraint with respect to new major programs in the field of strategic offensive weapons is an important factor in maintaining stability and ensuring the productivity of the negotiations themselves. It can hardly be denied that new major weapons programs which mean stepping up the race in strategic offensive armaments would be contrary to the aims of the negotiations, which ensue from the spirit and letter of the agreements concluded.

At the last meeting both Delegations spoke on the subject of the Standing Consultative Commission. It became evident views of the that the/two sides regarding the timeliness of a solution to this problem coincide.

SECRET-EXDIS

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The Commission must be established to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, the Interim Agreement between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USSR and the USA, in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of the Treaty, Article VI of the Interim Agreement and Article VII of the Measures Agreement.

We proceed from the premise that the Commission would consist of two parts--a Soviet and an American component. The chairmen of the components of the Commission would be co-chairmen of the Commission. To ensure the effective work of the Commission, the co-chairmen would inform each other, in advance if possible, of the questions to be submitted for discussion. Naturally, in the course of the meetings the chairmen of the components of the Commission could also submit for discussion any questions within the competence of the Commission.

SECRET-EXDIS

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Acting in concert, they would resolve problems related to the activities of the Commission, inform each other of the personnel composition of their respective Commission components, agree on the holding of meetings, and so forth.

The composition of each component of the Commission could include a chairman, three members and an executive secretary. Each side would be able to call in advisors and experts to participate in the meetings. In addition, the Commission could set up special working groups to consider and work on individual questions.

If necessary, the results of discussion at Commission meetings could be recorded in a Protocol.

This is how the Commission we are discussing appears to us. Desiring to make a practical contribution to resolving this question, the USSR Delegation submits for discussion a draft of the Standing Consultative Commission Regulations. [Attached]

Naturally we are prepared to consider the views of the U.S. side on this question.

Summarizing our views on the new stage of SALT, I would like to note that in the opinion of the Soviet side our work should proceed in three basic directions:

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First, discussion of questions which arise in connection with activating a mechanism for the agreements which have already entered into force. Specifically, we have in mind the Standing Consultative Commission.

Second, consideration of ways to reach agreement on more comprehensive measures for limiting strategic offensive arms and possible conversion of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms into a permanent accord, appropriately expanding its contents.

Third, consideration of the possibility that the sides assume obligations to exercise restraint in areas that are not limited by agreement, and also not to undertake new major strategic offensive weapons programs.

We are convinced that achievement of mutually acceptable solutions in these directions during the new stage of the negotiations would be a contribution to ensuring lasting peace and security and would serve as a practical indicator of the consistent movement of our states toward complying with the obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, increasing the viability of which you, Mr. Ambassador, mentioned at the last meeting.

There is no doubt that during the new stage we will have to accomplish complex and multi-faceted work. We agree with the U.S. Delegation that the current phase is of a preliminary nature, as it were. To facilitate further discussions in a search for mutually acceptable solutions, it is undoubtedly useful to define here the range of questions on which we will be working and to thoroughly explore areas of contact. Adhering to the direction outlined, this will make it possible to discuss the essence of the problems. In the process of defining the range of questions for the forthcoming discussion, we will be able to study more deeply the sides' positions, their views and approaches to the problems for which we are to find solutions.

We agree with the U.S. Delegation that this kind of exchange of opinions at the present session could contribute to expanding the areas where there is a coincidence of views and to identifying promising areas that could be considered by our Governments.

As a result we could lay the necessary groundwork for future, more detailed discussions on the essence of questions. In this connection the proposal advanced by the U.S. Delegation at the November 21 meeting, to develop an agreed program of work in the course of this session, appears to us to be acceptable in principle.

SECRET-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100012-8

The negotiations in which we are engaged require a most attentive and patient approach. To a certain extent they are also of a creative and exploratory nature. It is necessary to exert efforts to approach solution to the complex and multiform problem before us persistently, step by step. In our view, from this ensues the need to see to the maintenance of the most favorable atmosphere for work of this nature.

We have already acquired a great deal of experience in joint work, in which the sides have sought to understand the peculiarities of approach to one or another aspect of questions, to search for possibilities of converging our positions and establishing better mutual understanding. We proceed from the premise that in the future, too, both sides will be guided by the constructive and businesslike spirit which made it possible in the past for us to achieve substantial results.

SECRET-EXDIS

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Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100012-8
[Soviet Draft]

REGULATIONS FOR THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION

Article I

The Commission shall be responsible for promoting the objectives and implementing the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USSR and the USA of September 30, 1971, in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of the Treaty, Article VI of the Interim Agreement and Article VII of the Measures Agreement.

Article II

1. The Commission shall consist of Soviet and American components. Each component of the Commission shall include a Chairman, three Commission Members and an Executive Secretary. The Chairmen, the Members and the Executive Secretaries of the components of the Commission shall be appointed by their respective Governments.

SECRET-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100012-8

The Chairmen of the components of the Commission shall advise each other of the membership of their respective components of the Commission.

2. The Chairmen of the Soviet and the American components shall be Co-chairmen of the Commission.

Article III

1. Meetings of the Commission shall be convened, as necessary, upon the request of one of the Chairmen, who shall agree on arrangements for the meetings.

2. The Chairmen of the components of the Commission shall alternately chair meetings.

3. The Chairmen of the components of the Commission shall inform each other, in advance if possible, of the questions to be submitted for discussion at the meeting. In the course of the meetings the Chairmen of the components of the Commission may submit for discussion any questions within the competence of the Commission.

4. Each component of the Commission may call in advisors and experts to participate in the meeting.

5. The Commission may establish special working groups to consider and work on individual questions.

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Article IV

If necessary, the results of discussion of questions at Commission meetings may be recorded in a Protocol, the accuracy of the entries being certified by the Executive Secretaries. The Protocol shall be done in duplicate, each in the Russian and English languages.

Article V

In the interval between meetings each component of the Commission may, if necessary, transmit through its Chairman requests in writing addressed to the Chairman representing the other component of the Commission.

The Chairmen may also inform each other about matters within the competence of the Commission.

Article VI

Each side shall bear all expenses incident to participation in meetings by its component of the Commission.

Article VII

1. These Regulations shall enter into force upon their approval by both components of the Commission.

2. Amendments and additions to these Regulations may be made by consent of both components of the Commission.